Crisis elections and the primacy of policy: explaining media framing of election coverage by O'Malley, Eoin et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crisis elections and the primacy of policy: 
explaining media framing of election 
coverage 
  
 
 
Eoin O’Malley, Heinz Brandenburg, Roddy Flynn,  
Iain McMenamin, and Kevin Rafter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Working Papers in International Studies  
 
Centre for International Studies 
 
Dublin City University 
 
 
No. 6/2012 
 
 Centre for International Studies  Dublin City University  Ireland  cis@dcu.ie  www.dcu.ie/~cis 
 
 
 
No. 6/2012 
 
 
Crisis elections and the primacy of policy: 
explaining media framing of election 
coverage 
 
 
Eoin O’Malley† Heinz Brandenburg‡, Roddy Flynn*,  
Iain McMenamin†, and Kevin Rafter* 
 
†School of Law and Government, Dublin City University  
‡ Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen 
*School of Communications, Dublin City University 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Media coverage of elections in Europe and North America has increasingly 
tended to focus on the horse-race and the campaign as a game rather than 
the policy debate pertinent to the election. This is often explained by the 
changes in media pressures. It may also make sense given the narrowing 
of policy space between left and right and the comparative prosperity 
enjoyed in Europe and North America. But the relevance of politics varies. 
The economic crisis in the west might have led to an increased interest in 
policy among voters and focus on it by media. Ireland experienced both 
extremes of boom and crisis between the late 1990s and 2011. The Irish 
case allows us use a quasi-experimental approach to test the impact of 
crisis on media framing of elections. This article uses original data from 
Ireland’s last three elections, and with a design that shows when other 
pertinent variables are held constant, we find empirical support for the 
theoretical expectation that the context of the election affects the relative 
focus on campaign or horserace versus substantive policy issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
In the 2010 UK election the Financial Times (FT) was concerned that the 
campaign coverage had focussed too much on personality and not enough 
on substance (Financial Times May 3 2010). Given that voters get much of 
their information about parties during election campaigns, and that most 
of voters’ exposure to a campaign comes mediated through the press, radio 
or television we would expect the result of this perception to be that voters 
are primed to consider personality or character traits over policy issues. 
The implication of the FT’s point is that voters risk making 
misjudgements because their focus is on the wrong criterion for their vote. 
 
Democracy for many has been under threat – by elite domination (Mosca 
1923), market control and resource inequalities (Pierson 1992), and a lack 
of competence on the part of citizens (Sniderman 1993: 219). For some 
time many have been concerned about the ability of democracy to be 
subverted by poor quality debate. Plato, in the Gorgias, worried that the 
ignorant masses could be easily misled by skilled rhetoricians. Democracy, 
to work, needed citizens to focus on rational arguments (although Plato 
doubted that ordinary citizens could). If we assume citizens are potentially 
competent to govern themselves, they might depend on access to 
information and the ability to observe relevant debate.  
 
Many, such as Keane (1993), see that a good quality public service media 
and a plurality of media outlets are essential to the proper functioning of 
democracy. If media are covering the ‘wrong’ aspects of electoral 
campaigns then there is a significant problem. For instance Cappella and 
Hall Jameison (1997) found that the media fuel public cynicism in politics 
through the way they cover politics, a position supported by other 
observers (Fallows 1997; Downie Jr. and Kaiser 2002; Patterson 1994). 
Cappella and Hall Jameison specify the type of coverage they worry about 
as game-framed coverage; that is, coverage that frames political debate as 
a game played between politicians and not one in which important policy 
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issues are debated. They argue that the media’s focus on the ‘game’ of 
politics to the detriment of the substance of policy issues is at the root of 
voter cynicism and disengagement. It might also be of less use to voters in 
making an informed choice in elections. Because of the predominance of 
game-framed coverage, voters tend to be much better informed about a 
candidate’s or a party’s electoral prospects than about their policy 
positions, with vote choice then also being driven by perceived viability, 
i.e. backing a winner, rather than choosing according to issue preferences 
(Iyengar 1990; Bartels 1988). 
 
If this is a problem, it might also be one that is getting steadily worse. One 
of the main arguments for why the media have moved towards covering 
politics as a game is due to commercial pressures (Patterson 2000). 
Competition between the press and broadcast media might have caused a 
shift to focus on campaign events and stories at the expense of substantive 
policy issues. News in the form of storying telling is cognitively easier to 
understand (Westin 2007; Lakoff 2008) and consumption of serious news 
has declined vis-à-vis softer forms. According to Iyengar and McGrady 
(2007: 62) writing about the US ‘no matter what the medium, the public 
affairs content of the news has been diluted’. More recent changes, 
including the advent of free sheets (newspapers usually handed out at 
transport hubs of urban areas) and free access to internet news sources 
sees newspapers compete for fewer paying readers. The 24-hour news-
cycle might increase the pressure on news outlets to produce copy, 
reducing the time journalists have to make considered judgements on 
policy issues (Conboy 2011: 99).  
 
In this article we accept that any move towards game-oriented coverage of 
election campaigns may be in part due to commercial pressures and 
changes in medium, especially as the internet changes how and how 
quickly news can be gathered and disseminated; but political factors will 
also matter. Any move to game-framed coverage may also be caused by the 
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tightening of the policy space and the relative prosperity many western 
democracies enjoyed from the 1950s. But is there a unidirectional trend 
toward ‘dumbing down’ or softer forms of news? Or is it rather a matter of 
variation in how elections are treated by the media, and if so what might 
cause this variation? 
 
The context in which an election takes place must surely matter. We make 
the proposition that when an election takes place at a time of crisis; that 
is, when there is a clear policy problem that people are concerned about, 
the media revert to a more issue or policy-based debate. The economic 
crisis in Europe offers an opportunity to test this. Using original data we 
study the case of Ireland, which after its 2007 election suffered a severe 
economic shock that ultimately saw the country enter an external support 
programme backed by the IMF, the ECB and the EU in November 2010. 
The external intervention caused the fall of a government and early 
elections. We study how the print media covered that 2011 ‘crisis’ election 
and look at how it compares with other recent elections held against a 
buoyant economic backdrop. We find that the press focus is related to how 
important policy is to voters and to the sense of crisis in the country. The 
conclusion we draw is more positive than that which other scholars have, 
in that we find that in elections that truly matter, the media perform its 
duty. The idea of a ‘crisis’ election or that elections vary in importance for 
a country is also useful. This allows us to discover other variables, such as 
economic growth or war, that can explain variation in the media approach 
to politics.  
 
In the following section we discuss how we might explain variation in 
media coverage of elections. We consider a number of independent 
variables that might be influential. After offering a short description of the 
case, looking at the context of Irish elections in the between 1997 and 2011 
we then set out our research design, in which by comparing three Irish 
elections, we can hold all but one of these variables constant. After 
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discussing the data collection we present our findings and conclude with a 
discussion. 
 
 
Explaining variation in election coverage 
There are many ways of measuring how elections are covered in 
campaigns. One is to look at the amount of coverage elections are given as 
a percentage of total space (McMenamin et al. 2012). Another is to look at 
the ratio of soft news to hard news, however defined (Scott and Gobetz 
1992). A third way is to look at the relative attention to episodic (stories) 
compared to thematic (general) frames (Iyengar 1991). Possibly the most 
commonly used ways to distinguish between types of news coverage is to 
look at policy-focussed news and that which relates to the game of politics 
(Cappella and Hall Jamieson 1997; see also Aalberg, Strömbäck, and de 
Vreese 2012 for a comprehensive review of literature on strategy and 
game frames in political coverage). Strömbäck and van Aelst (2010) 
understand ‘the game’ to refer to the ‘strategy of political 
campaigning,…the horserace and battle for voters,…the images of 
politicians…political power as a goal in and of itself, or…politicians and 
persons rather than as spokespersons for certain policies’ (Strömbäck and 
van Aelst 2010: 48) (see codes 130, 140 and 150 in Appendix One).  
 
Modern election coverage is both a political and a media phenomenon. 
Therefore, it is expected that variation in election coverage is a function of 
both media and political variables.  The first media factor is commercial 
pressure. Some scholars argue that the increasing commercialisation of 
the media explains the increasing focus on the game (Strömbäck and van 
Aelst 2010). Media outlets should find it easier to generate advertising 
revenue and attract audience share/ readers by covering politics as a 
game; an exciting contest, akin to a sporting contest, with heroes and 
villains, rather than policy debates, filled with jargon, statistics, and 
caveats. For instance the recent US debate on ‘Obamacare’ could be 
approached in two ways: the media could cover the substance of the debate 
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on health policy or they could discuss the strategic game of how likely it is 
that the policy will succeed, in terms of being passed. The greater the 
pressure to generate profits, the more likely the media is to cover politics 
as a game. In electoral contexts the game frame might treat elections as a 
‘horse race’, where the audience is interested in who is winning, losing or, 
who has fallen at a hurdle (such as a political scandal), rather than 
looking at the substantive issues at stake in the campaign. Elections are 
especially easy to cover as a game because there is an eventual winner. 
They are analogous to sports events in many ways – some electoral 
contests are foregone conclusions and so less interesting whereas some are 
competitive and hence exciting affairs. Media outlets can drive this 
coverage by encouraging or commissioning certain campaign events. Some 
campaign events, such as leader debates or opinion polls, facilitate 
commercially-driven media to game-frame election coverage. So we should 
see that when leader debates are introduced, game-framing of election 
coverage increases.  
 
The second media factor is professional norms. In some media systems 
and outlets professionalism is defined as an absence of partisan bias (for 
instance the BBC), while in others professionals should be politically 
engaged, and ideologically motivated (for instance Fox News). In reporting 
substantive policy debates journalists struggle to remove their own values, 
and their analysis almost inevitable involves some judgement on the 
desirability of the policies in question. Where a norm exists against 
partisanship we are most likely to see elections portrayed as a game, as 
this makes it easier to avoid the appearance of favouring one side over 
another (Hallin 1994: 25). Those who strive to avoid accusations of bias 
might concentrate instead on the likelihood of the policy being passed. The 
decline of political parallelism in newspapers and the spread of 
professional norms of objectivity can be used to explain the increasingly 
game-oriented framing of elections. 
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Political variables appear to be somewhat less prominent in the literature 
on election coverage. Nonetheless, they should have substantial effects on 
media framing of elections. First, the basic institutional structure makes a 
difference to the nature of elections and should therefore influence how 
the media portray them. In consensual political systems, many actors, 
partisan, institutional, and civil society, have an important role in policy-
making. By contrast, in majoritarian democracies decisions tend to be 
centralised in an executive controlled by one party. In consensual 
countries, elections more rarely lead to a clear turnover in power. Indeed, 
it is often policy-oriented coalition negotiations, rather than elections, that 
bring about shifts in power. On the other hand, in majoritarian systems, 
elections can transfer power to a totally different set of actors. Therefore, 
election coverage in majoritarian elections is likely to be much more game-
oriented as elections usually have clear winners and losers. Lawrence 
(2000) hypothesises a related explanation based on the decision-making 
capacities of different political institutions. She finds in her case study of 
US welfare reform in the mid-1990s that the game frame should be more 
likely where there is policy conflict with a clear ‘winner’.  
 
The available evidence, such as it is, strongly favours this hypothesis. 
Kaid and Strömbäck (2008: 424) summarise existing research on election 
coverage in twenty countries. While acknowledging differences in the 
source case studies, they identify the type of coverage as game, policy, or 
mixed for 17 of the 22 countries covered. Of these in only one (the 
Netherlands) are substantive issues dominant and then in just two more 
(Japan and Sweden) do we see issues dominate coverage in the press, but 
not in the broadcast media (see Table 1).  
 
Using empirical work that classifies regimes as predominantly consensual 
or majoritarian (Lijphart 1999: 248; McMenamin 2004: 269) we can see if 
there is a systematic difference according to political decision-making 
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structures.1 Coding game as zero, mixed as one, and policy as two, the 
mean for majoritarian states is 0.1, while for consensual states it is 0.86 
(see Table 1). This difference is statistically significant (one-tailed t-test, 
p=0.0039).   
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Our second political variable is more prominent in the literature. It has 
been argued that a narrowing of the terms of political competition has 
pushed election coverage towards the game-frame (Strömbäck and van 
Aelst 2010; Binderkrantz and Green-Pedersen 2009). The narrower the 
ideological and policy differences between parties, the more the game 
frame will dominate. Many argue that there has been a shift towards 
valence competition in recent decades. Parties and voters agree on the 
ends of politics. Parties compete only in terms of performance in achieving 
these ends (Stokes 1963; Green 2007). This is usually interpreted as 
resulting in a focus on the characteristics of leaders and politicians, rather 
than policy choice.  
 
A third political variable could be the competiveness of a specific election. 
A competitive election is more exciting and easier to characterise in game 
terms, so we would expect that close elections or those with uncertain 
outcomes will have more game-oriented coverage. To date the literature 
offers only mere speculation instead of analysis on this question 
(Strömbäck and Aalberg 2008) which may be because measuring closeness 
across countries is not always straightforward. While in countries with 
plurality electoral systems and two-party systems we can measure it as 
                                                 
1
 Consensual regimes score below the mean on Lijphart’s executive-parties dimension. We coded 
South Africa as relatively majoritarian and Bulgaria as relatively consensual.  Bulgaria has a multi-party 
system; has usually had coalition governments; governments have been relatively short-lived 
governments, including caretaker cabinets; most seats are filled by proportional representation; and 
the interest group system is weak.  Democratic South Africa has been dominated by one party; has 
had single-party, dominant governments; the electoral system is proportional; and the interest group 
systems has corporatist aspirations but is quite fragmented. 
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the difference between the top two parties, in proportional representation 
systems competiveness is not so easily quantified. The parties may not 
appear to balance on a knife edge, but possible coalition outcomes might. 
Also elections may be close for a number of different reasons, some related 
to the other independent variables. To test it we would need to use 
multivariate analyses, not available to us here.  
 
Our final political variable is the type of election. Reif and Schmitt (1980) 
noting different voting behaviour in elections to the European Parliament 
compared to national elections, conceived the first-order and second-order 
election models. First and second order elections are usually distinguished 
in terms of the importance of the office being elected. Where the election is 
important, that is to the primary policy-making institutions, voters are 
thought to concentrate on the intrinsic choice at stake in the election. In 
second-order elections voters are less concerned by the formal focus of the 
election but instead use it to, perhaps, express dissatisfaction with the 
government or signal to the government the wish to move in a certain 
policy direction. Second-order elections tend to have lower turnout while 
smaller parties do well and government parties do worse than we would 
otherwise expect.  
 
In distinguishing electoral contests in this way elections to the same office 
in the same country, e.g. elections to the US Presidency or UK general 
elections, are essentially invariable. However, elections to the same office 
within a country are more important at some times than at others. We 
might consider that an election at a time of ‘crisis’ in a country is an 
election that matters more – one where the population needs to make a 
choice between two policy paths. This contrasts with elections that take 
place during periods of contentment. We can then think of the crisis 
election as a first-order election, where we expect to see higher turnout, 
reflecting a greater interest and engagement in the substantive issues 
facing the electorate at that time. Elections in periods of contentment, by 
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contrast, should generate lower turnout and focus on extraneous issues. 
More to the point we have expectations about media coverage. Certain 
policy issues are nearly always important, for instance the economy, but 
only at times are these issues regarded as important problems (see 
Wlezien 2005). When issues can be conceived of as problems facing society 
and when those problems are great, then we might see a greater policy 
focus by politicians and policy interest from the general public. When 
society faces crucial choices on issues that are of fundamental importance 
to people’s lives, the electorate will demand more serious policy debate 
from competing politicians. They will also expect that the media reflect 
this serious debate in their electoral coverage. Thus we hypothesise that: 
 
Everything else being equal media frames of elections will become 
more policy-focussed during periods of crisis. 
 
One might argue that the type of election variable and policy space 
variable are correlated. The policy space might normally widen in a crisis. 
If the status quo is unsustainable, political actors, the media, and election 
debates are forced to imagine new alternatives, question their own 
previous assumptions, and consider major choices. However, crises can 
also narrow policy options. For instance in the case of a military invasion 
or attack, events may remove other policy options as acceptable courses of 
action.  
 
The context of the 2011 Irish general election  
Ireland in 2002, 2007 and 2011 represent interesting contrasts, though the 
elections were to fill the same offices and broadly the same parties 
contested them. The 2002 and 2007 elections can be regarded as contented 
elections, whereas in 2011 the country was clearly experiencing a crisis. 
The election in 2011 was called before the parliamentary term had 
finished because the government’s teetering majority finally fell as a 
result of the intervention of the IMF and Ireland’s entry into an external 
 10 
programme to fund the Irish state. The election was the third most 
volatile in terms of changes in party support in post-war European history 
and the most volatile in which no new party emerged (Mair 2011). 
 
Ireland had up to 2008 enjoyed the epithet ‘Celtic Tiger’ as its economy 
had grown at remarkable rates from 1997 to 2007. Unemployment had 
fallen to close to four per cent; employment had doubled; and Ireland, 
traditionally a country of emigration, saw its population rise through a 
combination of high immigration and high fertility rates. While growth in 
the early part of the so-called Tiger period were caused by a significant 
inward-investment boom and a strengthening of the domestic economy, 
after 2002 the high rates of property-price growth fed consumer-led 
growth that was ultimately unsustainable. Irish banks in particular fed 
the property bubble through lax lending funded by cheap credit available 
on international money markets. The very weak regulation of those banks 
became apparent in late 2007 during the ‘credit crunch’. The weakening 
position of the Irish banks came to a head in September 2008 when they 
could not access money on the financial markets to service their debts, and 
their loan-books were increasingly troubled as more and more loans were 
defaulting. On being told that a bank was with a day or two of collapsing, 
the Irish government guaranteed the debt of Irish banks. It believed that 
the banks were solvent but suffering from a short-term liquidity problem. 
In fact the banks were insolvent and the €70bn bank rescue was the result 
of what was, given the size of the country, the biggest banking failure in 
world financial history. 
 
At the same time Irish tax revenues were falling dramatically. Irish 
governments had increased state spending in the previous ten years, and 
were now under pressure to reduce this quickly. A number of emergency 
budgets followed that reduced government spending, but the deficit in 
Ireland remained stubbornly high at about ten per cent of GDP. Between 
2008 and 2011 real GNP declined by 11.9 per cent. General government 
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debt increased from 25 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 107 per cent of GDP in 
2011. Between 2000 and 2007 the unemployment rate averaged 4.5 per 
cent. This increased substantially, estimated at 14.4 per cent in 2011. 
Although Ireland had seen recessions before, particularly in the 1980s, 
none had seen as sharp a drop in economic activity. We can see that if we 
are measuring the independent variable of election type as a dichotomy 
between crisis and contentment the three elections in 2002, 2007 and 2011 
represent extreme cases. 
 
Research design 
In order to investigate whether the type of election – crisis or contentment 
– is a significant variable in explaining the framing of election coverage by 
media outlets we ideally want to compare a large number of elections, in a 
number of countries where there is variation on this variable. There is a 
dearth of comparative research in political communications in large part 
because of the differences in coding (Aalberg, Strömbäck, and de Vreese 
2012). This means there is a lack of cross-nationally comparative data 
(Norris 2009). As a result meaningful comparison can often just be made 
at the within-country level. However, Wilke and Reinemann (2001) show 
how single-country cases can make a significant contribution to 
comparative research in political communications. 
 
In this section, we analyse the Irish case in terms of the previous 
theoretical discussion. In doing so, we consider cross- and intra-case 
perspectives. We are able to demonstrate that the Irish case is a least-
likely case for a policy framing of elections compared to many other 
countries. Moreover, we argue that the 2011 election was a least-likely 
case for policy-focussed coverage in all but one respect, that of the 
unprecedented crisis the Irish economy, polity, and society faced.  
 
First, commercial pressures in the Irish newspaper business are very high. 
The Irish newspaper market is highly competitive. The press is small, 
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crowded and unsubsidised, and Irish-based newspapers must compete 
with Irish editions of British newspapers. Commercial pressure in 2011 
was probably greater than any other point in the newspapers’ history. 
Like newspapers elsewhere, Irish papers were losing circulation which fell 
by 22 per cent between 2007 and 2011.  The economic crisis put much 
greater pressure on newspaper advertising revenues which fell by 56 per 
cent in the same period.2 Thus sales have come to constitute a greater 
share of revenue. In particular, the papers very much shared in the Irish 
property bust. Some of the papers had become dependent on lucrative 
property supplements during the boom, and like the Irish State itself, 
faced a massive shortfall in revenue when the property market crashed. 
Even those papers that could turn a profit were saddled with large boom-
era debts. These commercial pressures should have increased their 
incentive to reduce costs and sell more papers which the literature 
suggests can be achieved by framing the election as a game. Indeed, 
unprecedented numbers of opinion polls and leaders debates on TV in 
2011 made it easier than ever for the papers to provide game-oriented 
coverage.  
 
Second, Ireland reflects the liberal model of media systems (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004), which has a norm of impartial reporting and a rigorous 
distinction between ‘hard news’ and commentary. Papers are not now 
clearly associated with parties and seem to endeavour to contain a 
plurality of opinion. Indeed, there is very good evidence that Irish 
journalists do not generally express their political opinions through their 
reporting. Survey responses suggest that Irish journalists are much more 
(socially) liberal and (economically) left-wing than their paper’s editorial 
stances and indeed Irish society in general (Corcoran 2004). We see no 
evidence to suggest that his variable is not constant across the three 
elections.  
                                                 
2
 Calculated from Audit Bureau of Circulation 2008 - 2011 and the advertising figures are IAPI 
Adspend/Nielsen Media Research 2008 – 2011. 
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Third, Ireland is not a consensual democracy. Lijphart places it on the 
border between consensus and majoritarianism, but Irish political 
scientists would argue that it is much closer to the Westminster model. In 
particular, the Irish executive is very much dominant, even outdoing the 
British exemplar in government domination of the legislature (O'Malley 
and Martin 2010). Admittedly, Ireland has had coalition governments in 
recent decades, but power is not shared with the opposition. Ireland has 
also given a significant role for interest groups, known as the ‘social 
partners’. The system of social partnership largely collapsed as a result of 
the economic crisis, returning much power to the core executive. 
Generally, given the institutional structure Ireland has should see a 
tendency toward the game frame. 
 
Fourth, Ireland is known for its non-ideological politics. While social and 
ideological patterns are discernable, they are subtle and apparently 
ephemeral compared with those in other established democracies (see 
Byrne and O'Malley 2012). Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, two pragmatic, 
conservative, nationalist parties, have dominated Irish politics since the 
1920s. The small Irish Labour Party is one of the most centrist left-wing 
parties in Europe. At the national level, this ideological consensus makes 
Ireland a most likely case for game framing, as parties and leaders 
compete on valence issues. At the constituency level, the electoral system 
produces relatively candidate-centred competition, which focuses on the 
representation of local interests at the expense of national policy. It could 
be argued that Ireland’s entry to the external funding programme in late 
2010 reduced the scope for policy debate, as so little remained to be 
decided by the Irish political system. While many commentators and some 
politicians advocated rejection or renegotiation of the bailout deal, an 
analysis of the parties’ manifestos shows no significant widening or 
contraction of the policy space (Suiter and Farrell 2011). 
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We have argued that Ireland was a least likely case for a policy-oriented 
framing of election coverage in 2011. The commercial pressure on 
newspapers, journalistic norms, pattern of democracy, and the nature of 
party competition all point towards a system in which elections are likely 
to be framed as a game. Moreover, these variables also point towards a 
more game-oriented coverage than in recent Irish elections, except for 
professional norms which are neutral. Table 2 summarises these 
arguments.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
This brings us to the final variable, election type, or more specifically for 
this case economic crisis. The 2011 election clearly represents an ‘extreme 
case’ where the value observed in the independent variable being tested – 
the type of election – ‘lies far away from the mean of a given distribution’ 
(Gerring 2007: 101-102). The systemic crisis in Ireland points towards 
policy framing, both in comparison to Ireland’s past, and previously 
studied elections in other countries because the policy choices Ireland 
faced seemed to matter more than ever. We can see that the crisis had an 
impact on people’s vote choice. The proposed Taoiseach (prime minister) 
and the set of ministers were important criteria for 35 per cent of voters in 
choosing how to vote in 2007. This dropped to 20 per cent in 2011. 
Meanwhile the criterion of ‘policies set out by the parties’ increased from 
25 per cent to 43 per cent over the two elections (Marsh and Cunningham 
2011: 185).  
 
Ireland’s crash represents a natural experiment where we see a 
‘treatment’ administered presenting itself as a sharp change in an 
independent variable in one point on a time-series (Gerber and Green 
2008). We use a series of observations on the policy/ game dependent 
variable, and see if the ‘treatment’ of the financial crisis, leading to a crisis 
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election, caused an interruption to the dependent variable, while other 
potentially influential variables are held constant. 
 
Cook and Wong (2008: 144) suggest ‘the inclusion of an untreated control 
group with multiple observations, can help rule out plausible threats to 
validity’. There is no perfect control case because few countries share the 
same political and media systems. The UK might be a case that is as close 
as we can reasonably find. The UK has both relevant similarities and 
differences with Ireland. The UK, like Ireland, has a majoritarian political 
system. Both press markets are predominantly commercial and indeed 
many UK titles have Irish editions that take their style and tone from the 
British parent. To some extent Irish papers compete directly with UK 
rivals. But they differ in that UK papers tend to be associated with 
particular parties or have clear political leanings. Unlike in Ireland there 
are clear ideological differences between the parties, though these 
weakened since the 1990s. Crucially, however, while the economic crisis 
touched the whole world, its effects on the UK were much less than in 
Ireland. While unemployment increased, it did so by about three 
percentage points. Where Ireland suffered economic stagnation, 
cumulative GDP growth in the UK in the five years up to 2010 (when the 
election was held) was about 15 per cent (Kavanagh and Cowley 2010: 24). 
The economy was possibly a minor issue compared to the impact (in the 
media at least) of the political expenses scandal in the year preceding the 
2010 Westminster election. We can look at the effect of the crisis on policy 
coverage in Ireland in 2011 and compare it to the coverage of 2010 UK 
election where no similar crisis took place.  
 
Having outlined the research design, in the next section we describe the 
sources of the data, the coding scheme, sampling and inter-coder 
reliability tests. 
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Data 
We coded newspaper articles from each of the official election campaigns 
in 2002, 2007 and 2011. In 2002, we undertook a content analysis of four 
newspapers (Irish Times, Irish Independent, Irish Examiner and Evening 
Herald), while in 2007 five newspapers (the above plus the Irish Sun) 
were included. The analysis of 2011 election includes twelve national 
newspapers including Sunday broadsheets and tabloids. We coded all 
weekday issues throughout the short campaign, 25 April to 17 May in 
2002, 30 April to 26 May in 2007, and all issues published from 2 February 
to 25 February, 2011. All articles from the news section, comment pages 
and editorials with reference to the election, the campaign, or political 
parties, were included and coded line by line. Letters to the editor, e-mails 
or extracts from web coverage, such as ‘tweetwatch’ were excluded. The 
coding did include reviews of TV programmes on the election, including 
leader debates. In 2011 a random number generator was used to select 40 
per cent of the articles. This ensured that an even coverage of front-page 
and inside page articles was included in the sample.3 This procedure was 
followed for each issue in each newspaper.  
 
This resulted in a total of 1,217 articles from the 2002 election, 2,095 
articles from 2007 and 1,440 articles from 2011. We used the same coding 
scheme in all three elections; in the following we focus on descriptive 
statistics from the 2007 dataset while detailed information about the 2002 
dataset can be found in Brandenburg (2005) and details of coding of 
articles from the 2011 election can be found in McMenamin (2012). In 
2002 and 2007 the unit of measurement is text segments within articles, 
measured in the amount of space it takes up. An individual text segment, 
of varying length, is defined by having a unique value on each of these 
variables. As soon as a different issue or party is introduced, a new text 
segment begins. In 2011 text segments were again used, but because much 
                                                 
3
 For the Irish Independent, the proportion of articles sampled and coded was 30 per cent and these 
were then weighted up. As this is among the largest papers in terms of length, this sample was 
sufficient to make reasonable comparisons with the other papers. 
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of the articles now came from electronic formats they are measured in 
terms of ‘quasi-sentences’ (see Budge et al. 2001). The quasi-sentence is 
defined as an argument. A single sentence can be broken down to the 
number of arguments, each coded as a single unit. Because coders will not 
necessarily agree on the number of units in an article we might be worried 
that this would affect our results. We tested to see if the two coders 
differed in the number of codes used, but there was no significant 
difference. In any case, as we analyse the proportion of coverage, not the 
raw number of units, we do not consider that this would bias our results. 
Because the unit of observation in 2002 and 2007 is of variable length, 
whereas in 2011 it is of a (reasonably) standardised length, we weight the 
2002 and 2007 data by the size of the text. 
 
We measured inter-coder reliability in a number of ways. For the 2007 
data we randomly selected five articles from each newspaper for re-coding. 
This provided us with 919 units (text segments) for reliability testing. 
Using Krippendorff’s alpha, regarded as a conservative measure for inter-
coder reliability (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002: 600), we find 
that for game-oriented codes levels of agreement are highest at .95 and .94 
respectively, while for issue codes (see Appendix One), agreements are 
somewhat lower at .78 and .82 respectively. This is not surprising because 
of the larger range of values on those variables, but these findings 
compare well with other studies and fall into what would be considered by 
Krippendorff (1980) and Riffe, Lacy, and Fico (1998) as good quality data. 
In 2011 because the unit of analysis for our two coders was the quasi-
sentence rather than the whole article, we sampled 26 articles to give us 
up to 501 units (quasi-sentences). For the 2011 sample the Krippendorf’’s 
alpha was .93.  
 
 
Results 
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There has been a steady increase in the volume of electoral coverage in 
Irish media over time (Farrell 1978; Bowman 1987). Though analysis of 
media coverage of elections before 2002 is patchy we have some data for 
the Irish Times and Irish Independent, respectively the liberal ‘newspaper 
of record’ and  a more populist and popular broadsheet (Farrell 1993, 
1990). While the proportion of election coverage framed as policy 
decreased somewhat between 1973 and 1992 we see that the game frame 
has been increasing (see Table 3). This trend is consistent with the 
arguments made that there has been an ‘Americanisation’ of media across 
the world (Hallin and Mancini 2004). We can also see that there was some 
variation between newspapers. The Irish Independent had substantially 
more focus on the game than the Irish Times in the 1989 election for 
which we have data for both papers. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
There is a gap in available data, with no coverage of the 1997 election, but 
our original data show that policy coverage continued on a steady 
downward trend in 2002 (see Table 4). That variation between the papers 
narrowed considerably in 2002 with the Irish Times framing its coverage 
in policy terms even less than the Irish Independent. The only tabloid 
included in 2002, the Evening Herald, carried much less policy coverage 
than any of the broadsheets. In 2007, we see a more dramatic decrease in 
policy coverage, in the broadsheets as well as the tabloid for which we 
have comparative data. This may have been because 2007 was a much 
closer election than in 2002, which was seen as something of a foregone 
conclusion. Across all papers policy-framed election coverage drops by 
between 10 and 15 points. In 2007 the Irish Independent carries as little 
policy coverage as the tabloids, as a proportion of each paper’s election 
coverage.  
 
Table 4 about here 
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So when it comes to the 2011 election what happens? Though all other 
variables point to no change or a continuing fall in policy coverage our 
theoretical expectation is that the sharp deterioration in the performance 
of the Irish economy will cause an increase in issue-framed coverage. This 
is what we see. The tabloids see a large rise in policy-framed coverage of 
the 2011 election – at almost 50 per cent for one (though it should be noted 
that the amount of coverage tabloids devote to election coverage was very 
small (McMenamin et al. 2012). The increase for the broadsheets is even 
greater (by between 20 and 30 points), so most election coverage was 
policy focussed in 2011.  
 
If the much increased policy coverage in 2011 is related to the crisis then 
we expect that within the policy coverage, the subject of the crisis – the 
economy – would feature heavily. Voters clearly identify the economy as 
important in 2011. When asked the single most important issue or 
problem, 35.6 per cent mentioned the economic crisis and a further 13.5 
per cent mentioned related economic issues, such as unemployment 
(Lansdowne/ RTÉ exit poll). Table 5 breaks down the election coverage in 
the three elections. We observe a large increase in the coverage of the 
economy from 5.3 per cent in 2007 to almost 20 per cent in 2011. Two-
thirds of the articles that make any reference to the economy also 
explicitly refer to an economic crisis. When we make a direct comparison 
with just the newspapers coded in 2007 (final column in Table 5) we see a 
similar shift to policy-framed coverage. So this finding is not an artefact of 
the additional newspapers coded. Interestingly, the trend in game-framed 
coverage is not uniform. Coverage of the ‘campaign’ halves – from 40 per 
cent to less than 20 per cent – but the poll/ horserace coverage actually 
increases quite significantly. This may reflect the increase in opinion 
polling at the election. Despite this the overall policy-framed coverage is 
still substantially increased in 2011. 
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Table 5 about here 
 
Another issue that voters mention relates to the political system. This was 
identified as the most important issue by 36.3 per cent of the electorate 
(Lansdowne/ RTÉ exit poll). This may seem surprising but there was a 
strong sense in Ireland that the political system had failed and needed to 
be reformed. This issue was given much greater prominence in the 
manifestos of all the main political parties (Suiter and Farrell 2011). This 
increased priority was reflected in newspaper coverage. The political 
system code rose from negligible levels in 2007 to account for almost 12 
per cent of coverage in 2011. While we can see that the increase in policy 
focus by the press is reflected in the priorities of voters and presumably 
readers, our data can offer no hints as to any causal direction.  
 
Because of the very high number of observations, even substantively 
uninteresting changes in coverage shown in Table 5 are statistically 
highly significant. We therefore use a more conservative test of whether 
changes are statistically significant where we take the percentage 
coverage of each newspaper for which we have data common across the 
2007 and 2011 elections and conduct a two-tailed, paired t-test on the 
differences of the mean coverage over these elections. This makes for a 
much more strenuous test of difference, yet we still see that he following 
changes between 2007 and 2011 are statistically significant4: Political 
System (p. =0.00015), Economy (p.=0.0031), Campaigning (p.=0.0066), 
Polls/ Horserace (p.=0.011), Political Ethics (p.=0.0033) and Election 
(p.=0.0087, N is 5 for all). We can also see that the differences between 
2002 and 2011 are significant; so 2007 is not an aberration. 
 
                                                 
4
 The means on which these differences are calculated are different to those in Table 5 as they are 
based on an average of the percentage coverage in at most five newspapers, which treats each 
newspaper equally. Table 5 is based on the coverage by article and as such gives more weight to those 
papers that are published daily and those that provide greater election coverage. As such we can be sure 
our results are not an artefact of unusual patterns in one or two newspapers. The patterns are similar to 
those seen in Table 5. 
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The Interrupted Time Series design allowed us to see if the link between 
the election type and the media coverage of elections is due to the 
‘treatment’ of the massive economic shock. We also want to see if the case 
receiving the treatment varies from another control case. Table 6 shows 
the percentage of election coverage that is framed in policy issues in The 
Irish Times and the general UK press.5 Ideally we would have two systems 
which are similar on all independent variables except the ‘treatment’ 
variable, in this case the crisis election. We then expect the two to track 
one another, except after the ‘treatment’.  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
In fact the UK data show that election coverage there is more variable 
than it was in Ireland, which shows a steady downward trend. This could 
be because there is variation in the other independent variables we 
identify above. If we can generalise from so few data points, the UK seems 
to have slightly more policy-framed election coverage. This could be due to 
measurement differences or perhaps relates to the more ‘political’ nature 
of the press in the UK, where party-press parallelism is still high. The 
1992 and 2010 UK elections are unusual in that they show falls from what 
otherwise would be an essentially flat line. The 1992 deviation might be 
explicable when we consider it was a closer election than any since 1979. 
In 2010 the introduction of leader debates transformed the campaign 
structure and given the performance of the third party leader in the first 
debate, transformed the campaign itself. The 2010 debates accounted for 
12 per cent of front-page stories, compared to just three per cent on the 
economy. In any case the deviation in the UK data in 2010 goes in the 
same direction to that which Ireland had been going. The Irish election 
coverage in 2011 represents a strong divergence from the trend line. With 
the UK proportion of policy-framed coverage falling, we can confidently 
                                                 
5
 The UK data come from the ‘Press’ chapters in the ‘British General Election of’ series associated with 
David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh (Harrop and Scammell 1993; Scammell and Harrop 1997, 2002, 
2005; Scammell and Beckett 2010). 
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conclude that Ireland was unlikely to have gone in the direction it did 
anyway. If anything, except for the economic crisis, making this a special 
election in Ireland, we would have expected to see a continued downward 
trajectory in the proportion of policy coverage. We can see that in this 
case, where all other variables would have predicted a more game-oriented 
election, the economic climate the election took place in – the type of 
election – had a very substantial impact on how election coverage was 
framed by the press.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
A second way we can make the link between election coverage and ‘crisis’ 
is by seeing if there is a link between the coverage and some observable 
measure of crisis. As we have data ranging back to 1973 for one Irish 
newspaper, we can test if that paper’s coverage of election campaigns is 
associated with Ireland’s economic performance. One objective measure of 
performance is the unemployment rate. Figure 1 shows the relationship 
between the two. The correlation coefficient for the unemployment rate in 
the election years for which we have election coverage data from The Irish 
Times is .82 (p.=.043, N=7). This shows there is a remarkably strong, 
positive relationship between unemployment and the level of policy 
coverage of elections by this newspaper. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the economic context of an election will be an 
important determinant of the way the media chooses to frame elections. 
Borrowing from the first and second-order election model we can conceive 
of some elections to the same office as more important than others at 
different times. Specifically we say that some elections take place in a 
climate of contentment and some in a sense of crisis. We expect the game 
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frame to be more common in ‘contentment’ elections, whereas there should 
be a greater emphasis on policy in crisis elections.  
 
The 2002, 2007 and 2011 elections in Ireland provide useful cases where 
there was a sharp change in the importance of the election as a result of a 
dramatic change in the country’s economic fortunes. It was a least-likely 
case where all other variables pointed to reduced policy coverage. The 
effect of election type was shown in dramatic fashion, and was consistent 
across different types of newspapers. Furthermore, we see that within the 
policy coverage, the press covers those areas related to the crisis. 
 
This finding is of general interest to scholars of media and political 
communications. First it adds another, very powerful, variable to the list 
of explanatory variables used to explain media coverage of politics and in 
particular elections. The 1979 British General Election could be regarded 
as having taken place in an economic crisis, as would the 2012 Greek 
election. While it will often relate to economic performance, it should not 
be limited to it. There are other causes of an election being first order: a 
country newly in a state of war might judged by the electorate to be in a 
state of crisis. The 2001 and 2003 Israeli election that took place during 
the second Intifada would be a good example. Other types of crisis can also 
be identified, such as the 1994 and 1996 Italian elections that took place 
under the shadow of the Tagentopoli corruption allegations, which was a 
systemic crisis and saw the move from the First to Second Italian 
Republic. The actual performance might matter less than the comparison 
within the country to what had recently been experienced. Recessions 
might not appear to be as bad in a country which had previously only 
experienced slack growth. Northern Ireland had probably become immune 
to the semi-permanent conflict it experienced between the 1970s and 
1990s. Crisis or contentment is in the eye of the beholder. 
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The second conclusion is a more general one on the nature of media 
coverage. This case shows that when it matters the media can shift focus 
quite dramatically and concentrate on policy. In a country that had shown 
evidence of the hypothesised ‘dumbing down’ of news coverage, we observe 
that in special circumstances that trend can be reversed and in a dramatic 
fashion. So we can have a less pessimistic outlook on the press than other 
commentators have had: the media can be responsive and responsible 
when required. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Patterns of Democracy and type of election coverage 
Majoritarian  
US Game 
Australia Game 
Brazil Game 
UK Game 
Canada Game 
France Game 
Greece Game 
Mexico Game 
South Africa Game 
Spain Mixed 
Consensual  
Sweden Mixed 
Bulgaria Mixed 
Germany Game 
Israel Mixed 
Japan Mixed 
Netherlands Policy 
Poland Game 
Sources: (Lijphart 1999; McMenamin 2004; Kaid and Strömbäck 2008)  
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Table 2: Summary of theoretical expectations and the Irish case 
Media variables Hypothesised 
effect 
Irish value Prediction 
Commercial pressure Game Intense commercial 
pressure; more 
spending on 
opinion polls 
Game; cross- and 
intra-nationally 
Norms against 
partisan bias 
Game Strong non-partisan 
norms 
Game; cross-
nationally 
Political variables    
Majoritarian 
democracy 
Game Majoritarian Game; cross- and 
intra-nationally 
Narrow policy space Game Very narrow in 
terms of party 
system; extremely 
narrow because of 
bailout. 
Game; cross- and 
intra-nationally 
Election-type Policy Unprecedented 
crisis 
Policy; cross- and 
intra-nationally 
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Table 3: Campaign coverage Irish Times (Irish Independent) 1973-1992 
Year  Game (incl. 
personality 
traits, 
campaign 
issues) 
Policy issues Other 
(electoral facts, 
laws etc.) 
1973 37.5 
 
59.2 3.3 
1987 44.2 
 
53.9 1.9 
1989 46.0 (57.9) 
 
52.0 (40.6) 2.0 (1.6) 
1992 48.9 
 
48.6 2.5 
Source: Farrell (1993: 34; 1990: 39) 
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Table 4: Campaign coverage of substantive policy issues, 2002-2011 
Year Irish 
Times 
Irish 
Independent 
Tabloid Examiner 
2002 
 
43.8 40.9 32.8 
Herald 
44.4 
2007 
 
30.7 24.3 21.6 
Herald 
24.0 
Irish Sun 
24.6 
Daily Star 
32.7 
2011 
 
57.4 51.7 48.9 
Irish Sun 
42.7 
Daily Star 
53.5 
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Table 5: Election coverage in 2002, 2007 and 2011, % of total coverage 
(point change since earlier election) 
 2002 2007 2011 (all) 2011 
Political System 
 
2.7 0.9      (-1.8) 11.9    (+11) 
 
11.3 
Justice 
 
4.0 1.8      (-2.2) 1.3      (-0.5) 1.3 
Economy 
 
8.5 5.3      (-3.2) 19.8  (+14.5)  21.2 
Social Welfare 
 
9.6 5.6      (-4.0) 5.0      (-0.6) 5.7 
Other Policy 
 
7.7 6.7      (-1.0) 7.6      (+0.9) 8.2 
Country specific: 
Ireland 
0.3 1.0      (+0.7) 1.2      (+0.2) 1.1 
Campaigning 
 
37.0 40.4    (+3.4) 18.9   (-21.5)  19.1 
Polls/ Horserace 
 
16.0 10.0    (-6.0) 21.6  (+11.6) 
 
20.4 
Leadership 
 
2.2 5.3      (+3.1) 5.9      (+0.6) 4.3 
Political Ethics 
 
4.0 8.4      (+4.4) 2.6      (-5.8) 2.9 
Non-political 
 
0.6 0.2      (-0.4) 0.7      (+0.5) 0.5 
Election 
 
7.5 14.4    (+6.9) 3.0      (-11.4) 3.7 
Number of articles 
 
1,217 2,095 1,440 976 
Number of newspapers 
(N) 
4 5 12 5 
The three most common types of coverage (biggest changes) are in bold. 
For details on statistical significance see text. 
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Table 6. Policy focus of media coverage of UK and Irish elections over time 
Years UK front pages Irish Times coverage 
1987 54 53.9 
1989 no election 52.0 
1992 39 48.6 
1997 52 not available 
2001/2002 57 43.8 
2005/ 2007 56 30.7 
2010/ 2011 35 57.4 
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Figure 1. Relationship between the Irish unemployment rate  
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Irish Times policy coverage Irish unemployment rate
 
Sources: Farrell 1993, 1990 and Central Statistics Office, Dublin. 
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Appendix 1: Summary of coding scheme 
 
10 – Political System – incl. clientelism, women in politics, government 
control, effectiveness of public administration, electoral system and political 
reform 
20 – Justice – incl. crime/ law enforcement, penal system, courts and judiciary 
30 – Defence – incl. military spending, terrorism and intelligence 
40 – Economy – incl. unemployment, taxation, banking, Euro, pay, business, 
competitiveness, property market 
50 – Agriculture 
60 – Social Welfare – incl. Health, pensions, social justice, social housing and 
social services 
70 – Education – incl. education spending, religious control of schools 
80 – Arts/Culture – incl. arts spending 
90 – Infrastructure/Technology – incl. transport, regional development, 
science, broadband availability 
100 – Environment – incl. energy and waste 
110 – Foreign Affairs  
120 – Country specific: Ireland – incl. Northern Ireland, traditional values 
130 – Campaigning – incl. campaign diaries, stunts/ gaffes, campaign 
strategy, pledges (without describing policy), media coverage, party 
structure/ organisation, campaign finance 
140 – Polls/Horserace – incl. opinion polls, candidate selection, leaders’ 
debates (performance of leaders), likely composition of government/ 
outcome of election. 
150 – Leadership – references to competence and performance of leaders 
160 – Political Ethics – incl. corruption 
170 – Non-political – references that are not political but contained in articles 
on the election 
180 – Election – incl. turnout, exhortations to vote, descriptions of how voting 
system works, objective information, such as lists of candidates 
190 – Locality-specific issue  
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